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I.  Introduction 
  Economists have long been concerned over the effect of taxation on foreign direct 
investment (FDI).  A plethora of studies have examined whether and to what extent FDI 
responds to tax incentives.  While the specific results vary, the general consensus is that firms do 
indeed respond to a variety of tax policies.
1  This issue is of primary concern to economists 
because it can result in an inefficient allocation of investment across countries.  As governments 
use their tax policies to affect the rates of return on capital, provide public goods, or simply 
capture part of the profits that would otherwise be repatriated to other countries, this can divert 
investment from its most productive locations.  One potential method of relieving this 
inefficiency is a bilateral tax treaty on FDI.  These treaties adjust the tax environment for 
investment between treaty partners by specifying the applicable tax base, the withholding taxes 
that can be applied, and other measures affecting the taxation of FDI.  Worldwide, over 2,000 of 
these treaties are in force and they govern the taxation of the large majority of FDI (Radaelli, 
1997).   
  Since treaties indicate cooperative taxation by treaty partners, many economists assume 
that treaties increase investment.  However, it is by no means certain that treaties do so.  In 
particular, since treaties can reduce tax avoidance and other tax-saving strategies by firms, they 
might actually have a dampening effect on FDI.  Furthermore, legal researchers have questioned 
whether FDI promotion is even a primary goal of treaty formation.  In light of these conflicting 
arguments, the effect of tax treaties on FDI is an open question.  This chapter presents empirical 
results on treaty formation by OECD members.  Our findings suggest that, at least for recent 
treaties, treaty formation most likely does not increase FDI activity between members and may 
in fact decrease it.  Thus, our results stand at odds with the FDI promotion rationale for treaty 
formation. 
                                                           
1 See Wilson (1999) and Gresik (2001) for surveys of the both the theory and empirical economic 
literature regarding the effects of taxation on foreign investment.  
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  Before delving into our data analysis, it is instructive to consider the conflicting opinions 
about tax treaties.  The FDI promotion view of treaties springs from the idea of a tax distortion to 
investment.  To illustrate this concept, consider the following simple model of FDI.  An investor 
in the parent country has an amount of capital K that she can invest either in her parent country, a 
host country, or both.  The amount of her exported capital is Z, thus Z represents the level of 
FDI.  The rate of return in the parent country is a decreasing function of capital invested in the 
parent country r( K-Z), while rate of return in the host country is decreasing function of FDI  
r*(Z).  Efficiency requires that capital be allocated between the two countries such that the rates 
of return are equal (or that all the capital is invested in the high-return country).  However, the 
investor is not concerned with the total return on capital, but rather her share of it.  In other 
words, the investor bases her decisions on the after-tax rate of return in each country, not the 
gross rate of return.  As a result,  if t and t
* are the marginal effective tax rates on investment in 
the parent country and in the host, the investor will compare (1-t)r( K-Z) with (1-t*)r*(Z).
2  
Unless the marginal effective tax rates are equal, the equilibrium distribution of capital will be 
inefficient because efficiency calls for capital export neutrality in which only real, that is non-
tax, variations govern capital flows.  Therefore, as governments use their tax policies, it can quite 
easily lead to differential tax rates across locations and inefficient levels of FDI.  Note that 
differential tax rates do not require different statutory taxes since the effective tax depends on 
many factors, including the definition of the tax base, accelerated depreciation rules, research 
and development tax credits, double taxation relief, and the like.  It is generally believed that the 
effective tax rate against host investment exceeds that on investment in the parent country, 
implying that FDI is inefficiently low. Hines (1988) and Wilson (1993) support this concept by 
illustrating how typical parent country tax policies such as accelerated depreciation for domestic 
investments effectively result in tax rates that discriminate against overseas investment.  Tax 
                                                           
2 Since we are examining the marginal capital allocation, the appropriate tax rate is the marginal rate.  
Identification of the marginal tax rate is notoriously difficult.  Graham (1996) provides discussion of the 
various proxies researchers have used for the marginal tax on corporate income.  
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treaties can help to alleviate this problem by coordinating tax policies between treaty partners.  
This idea is mirrored in the introduction of the OECD’s model tax treaty, which states that a 
primary goal of treaty formation is “removing the obstacles that double taxation presents”, thus 
reducing its “harmful effects on the exchange of goods and services and movements of capital, 
technology, and persons” (OECD, 1997, p. I-1).
3  If treaties do indeed reduce these tax barriers 
to FDI, one would expect that FDI activity would rise after a treaty is enforced. 
  Although individual treaties include a wide range of specific investment incentives, 
overall treaties reduce the barriers to FDI in two ways.
4  First, by harmonizing the tax definitions 
and the tax jurisdictions of treaty partners, a treaty can reduce the double taxation of investment.  
For example, income is typically taxed in a host country when it is generated through a 
permanent establishment.  However, without a treaty each country can form its own definition of 
a permanent establishment.  If this definition differs between countries, it can lead to double 
taxation of overseas profits (Hamada, 1966).  Janeba (1996) discusses how these definition 
differences can then result in inefficient capital flows.  This idea is confirmed empirically by 
Hines (1988), who finds that the 1986 Tax Reform Act,  which revised U.S. tax definitions, led 
to an increase in U.S. outbound investment.  Since treaties standardize tax definitions and 
jurisdictions (often by matching them to those provided by the OECD’s model tax treaty (OECD, 
1997)), they have a similar potential to increase FDI.  
  Second, tax treaties affect the actual statutory taxation of multinationals.  They do so 
through the rules affecting double taxation relief and the withholding taxes levied on 
repatriations by FDI.  Following the OECD model treaty guidelines, most tax treaties specify that 
both countries must either exempt foreign-earned profits from domestic taxation or offer foreign 
tax credits when calculating the domestic tax bill.
5  Although most countries already offer their 
                                                           
3 For an excellent discussion of the workings of the OECD model tax treaty, see Baker (1994). 
4 For specifics of the treaties, see the treaties themselves as reprinted by Diamond and Diamond (1998). 
5 Under a tax credit, the domestic tax bill is calculated by applying the standard domestic tax rate to the 
pre-foreign tax level of overseas profits.  A credit against this amount is then applied up to the amount of  
5
investors credits or exemptions, certain treaties do alter the relief method applied by one or both 
treaty partners.
6  In addition to the provisions for double taxation relief, treaties usually reduce 
maximum allowable withholding taxes on three types of remitted income: dividend payments, 
interest payments, and royalty payments.
7    Some treaties lower these withholding rates to as 
low as zero.  Most treaties specify that the same maximum rates apply to both treaty partners.
8  If 
these reductions in the withholding tax reduce the tax burden on overseas investment, equivalent 
to reducing t
* above, this should increase FDI.
9  Note that even though withholding tax rates fall 
under a treaty, this does not imply that tax receipts from inbound investment must decline.  Since 
withholding taxes can be tailored to the specific investment from a treaty partner, it may be 
possible to set tax rates which encourage tax-sensitive inbound investment and actually raise 
total tax receipts.
10  In addition, treaties are accompanied by improved information exchange 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the foreign taxes paid.  If this credit exceeds the domestic tax liability, the firm is in an “excess credit” 
position and pays no additional taxes on these overseas profits.  If the parent country tax bill is greater 
than the amount of the credit, the firm is in an “excess limit” position and pays the remaining amount to 
the parent country’s government.  
6 For instance, Belgium applies a reduced domestic tax rate to the foreign-earned profits of its residents.  
Under the U.S./Belgium treaty, however, income earned by Belgian firms in the U.S. is exempt from 
Belgian taxation.  
7 Note that a lower foreign tax rate does not guarantee a reduction in the firm’s total tax bill.  When a 
parent country offers foreign tax credits, only firms in an excess credit position will benefit by a reduction 
in host taxes (Altshuler and Newlon, 1991).  Thus, a decrease in the overseas tax rate may not improve 
capital flows.  
8 One exception is the U.S. treaty with Pakistan in which U.S. firms receive no tax break from Pakistan 
while Pakistani firms do receive reduced tax rates from the U.S.. 
9 Several researchers, including Altshuler and Newlon (1991), Hines (1992), Altshuler, Newlon, and 
Randolph (1995), and Mutti and Grubert (1996) have found that firms do respond to changes in 
withholding tax rates by changing both the timing and method of repatriation.  However, this evidence 
suggests that treaties can affect the profitability of overseas investment, and does not necessarily imply 
that treaties will induce new FDI.  
10 As derived in Bond and Samuelson (1989) among others, the tax revenue maximizing tax rate on 
inbound FDI is 1/(1+,), where , is the elasticity of inbound FDI supply.  If , varies across countries, the 
revenue maximizing tax rate will differ across countries.  Since a treaty allows a country to lower its tax 
rate, this can actually raise tax revenues if the current tax rate is greater than the optimal tax on FDI from 
that particular country.  
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between partner governments.
11  Because of this, tax evasion may fall under a treaty, leading to 
increased tax revenue.
12  
  Combining these arguments, it is easy to understand the common expectation that tax 
treaties serve to increase the amount of FDI activity between treaty partners. Nevertheless, there 
exist several economic and legal arguments which suggest treaties may have no effect on FDI.  
For instance, Dagan (2000) asserts that the use of treaties to promote foreign direct investment is 
“a myth” (p. 939).  He claims that since a parent country could unilaterally adjust its tax policy to 
eliminate distortions caused by differing parent and host country tax policies, promotion of 
efficiency plays little role in treaty formation.  Instead, Dagan suggests that treaties are intended 
to reduce administration costs, reduce tax evasion, and to extract tax concessions from treaty 
partners.  Radaelli (1997) also dismisses the double taxation objective in favor of the view that 
tax treaties are geared towards reducing tax evasion.  Furthermore, there is the concern that tax 
treaties arise due to lobbying efforts by profit-seeking investors.  If this is the case, then treaties 
may be geared towards maximizing investor profits rather than promoting efficient investment.
13  
In addition to uncertainties about government objectives in treaty formation, it is by no means 
clear that firms’ investment activities will necessarily respond to reductions in withholding tax 
rates.  Hartman (1985) and Sinn (1993) argue that withholding taxes are irrelevant for expanding 
multinational firms since it is cheaper to expand an overseas affiliate through retained earnings 
than through repatriated and re-exported funds.  This is because retained earnings avoid the 
withholding taxes applied to repatriated funds.  As a result, they suggest that only mature, non-
                                                           
11 In addition to the bilateral treaties, the OECD has established the multilateral Convention on Mutual 
Assistance in Tax Matters which provides for information exchange even between members without 
bilateral treaties (OECD, 1989). 
12 Devereux, Griffith, and Klemm (2001) find that, even though corporate tax rates for the U.K. appear to 
have declined since the mid-1960s, tax revenues from corporate income have not.  They suggest that part 
of this result may stem from a broadening of the incomes classified as corporate. 
13  According to Radaelli (1997), treaty formation by the U.S. is free of such business lobbying efforts.  
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expanding foreign affiliates will repatriate earnings, implying no effect of withholding taxes on 
FDI.   
  Finally, it is even possible that tax treaties may actually increase the tax barriers for 
certain kinds of investment.  As noted above, through information exchange treaties can reduce 
the firm’s ability to engage in transfer pricing.  This is the practice by which, through 
manipulation of the price of goods traded between their various subsidiaries, firms can shift 
profits to low tax locations and minimize their global tax revenues.  As argued by Casson (1979), 
transfer pricing provides firms with an incentive to invest in those low tax locations in order to 
shield profits from taxes.
14  Since treaties streamline and promote the exchange of tax 
information by governments, this reduces firms’ ability to avoid taxes through misrepresentation 
of costs.  As a result, treaties may reduce the incentive to engage in investment for tax 
minimization reasons, leading to a decrease FDI activity.  In addition, recent tax treaties have 
sought to eliminate treaty shopping.  Treaty shopping is a practice in which investments are 
funneled through a treaty country by a third nation for the purpose of avoiding or reducing taxes.  
According to Radaelli (1997), concerns over treaty shopping have been a primary focus of many 
new treaties and have prompted the U.S. to renegotiate many of its older treaties.  In addition, 
certain so-called “tax haven” countries (particularly Aruba, Malta, and the Netherlands-Antilles) 
have seen several of their treaties cancelled due to perceived insufficient efforts to prevent treaty 
shopping.  If a treaty is revised to close this possibility, then this could easily reduce the 
investment activity between treaty partners as third nation investors choose to simply send their 
capital directly to the ultimate host.  While there are many variations in the regulations that 
address treaty shopping, the most common rules restrict treaty benefits if more than 50 percent of 
a corporation’s stock is held by a third, non-treaty country’s residents (Doernberg, 1997). 
                                                           
14 Caves (1993) provides an explanation of transfer pricing.  Graham and Krugman (1995) provide case 
studies of firms prosecuted by the U.S. for engaging in transfer pricing.  
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  With these conflicting arguments in mind, it is by no means certain that bilateral treaties 
will increase the amount of FDI between partner countries.  This issue is of importance because 
of the sizable costs to treaty formation.  For most countries, tax treaties are like any other 
international agreement in that they must be drawn up and then ratified by the appropriate 
governing body.  Ratification is no mean feat since the treaty cannot conflict with other national 
policies.  For the U.S., this is not a severe problem since tax treaties are federal instruments and 
thus supercede state or local laws.
15  This is not always true elsewhere.  Anders (1997), for 
example, gives an in-depth discussion of the difficulties the U.S.-German treaty faces since it 
may violate the anti-discrimination rules of the European Union.  Even ignoring such possible 
roadblocks, the simple conflicts of bilateral negotiation require much time and effort.  Conflicts 
over the terms of the treaty can lead to failure during the development stage or even during 
ratification.  For example, the U.S.-Cyprus treaty required three attempts before it was finally 
ratified in 1988.  Thus, in light of these large costs, it is important that we gauge the potential 
gains from treaty formation.  We seek to provide one possible measure of the gains from treaty 
formation by estimating the impact of treaty formation on the FDI of OECD members.
16   
  Using recent models developed by  Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2001) and Markusen 
and Maskus (2001), we test whether or not treaty formation by OECD members is associated 
with changes in FDI activity.  Using data from 1982 to 1992, we examine the behavior of FDI 
stocks and FDI flows.  Initial results indicate that treaties seem to increase FDI.  However, this 
result is suspect because the sample includes many older treaties which were enacted well before 
our data series begins.  Therefore, we also split our sample into “old” and “new” treaties.  Here, 
                                                           
15 Generally, the only limitation U.S. tax treaties place on state taxation is that a foreign corporation must 
be treated the same as a firm incorporated in another state (White, 1991).   
16 Hines and Willard (1992) empirically examined the number of treaties a country signs as well as the tax 
concessions dictated by a particular treaty.  However, they do not include the amount of FDI activity as an 
explanatory variable nor do they consider the effect of taxation on FDI.  The United Nations (1998) has 
studied the effects of bilateral treaties for the promotion and protection of FDI.  These treaties are 
generally geared towards increasing investment in developing nations by ensuring a favorable political 
and economic climate and do not address tax concerns.  
9
we find that new treaty formation is not significantly correlated with FDI activity.  In fact, when 
we restrict ourselves to just those countries that enacted a treaty during our sample, we find that 
FDI stocks are significantly decreased after treaty formation.  These results are consistent with 
Dagan (2000) and Radaelli (1997) who claim that recent treaties are not geared towards the 
promotion of FDI but rather towards reductions in tax evasion.  While these results do not mean 
that treaties cannot be used to increase FDI they do suggest that the FDI promotion argument 
seems suspect. 
The chapter proceeds as follows.  In Section II, we present our empirical methodology.  
We discuss our data in Section III.  Section IV presents our results and Section V concludes. 
 
II.  Empirical framework for statistical analysis 
  In order to examine how treaties affect FDI, we require a framework that describes the 
determinants of FDI.  Over the past couple decades, James Markusen and co-authors have 
developed formal general equilibrium theory models of multinational enterprise (MNE) 
activity.
17  These theory models lead to predictions of equilibrium FDI activity across bilateral 
pairs of countries in terms of a few observable factors.  Recently, Carr, Markusen and Maskus 
(2001) and Markusen and Maskus (2001) tested the “knowledge-capital” version of the 
Markusen model of MNE activity using data on affiliate sales of U.S. firms in other countries 
and foreign affiliate sales in the U.S. over the period 1986-1994.  They find substantial empirical 
fit of the knowledge-capital model to the data.  The Carr, Markusen, Maskus (CMM) empirical 
framework is specified by the following equation: 
 
FDIij =  f (SUMGDPij, GDPDIFSQij, SKDIFFij, SKDIFFij* GDPDIFFij, 
                                                                               (SKDIFFij)
2*T_OPENj, Zij, TREATYij)      (1) 
             
                                                           
17 For recent examples of this work, see Markusen, Venables, Eby-Konan, and Zhang (1996) or Markusen 
and Venables (1997).  
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The dependent variable, FDIij is a measure of FDI activity from a parent country (i) to a 
host country (j).   CMM use affiliate sales data as their “FDI” measure, though Blonigen and 
Davies (2000; 2001) find that the CMM empirical framework also fits U.S. FDI stock (and to 
some extent, FDI flow) data reasonably well.   
The first five independent variables on the right hand side of equation (1) are the 
variables specific to the CMM framework.  The first two terms are relatively straightforward, 
with SUMGDP defined as the sum of the two countries’ real gross domestic products (GDPs), 
and GDPDIFSQ defined as the squared difference between the two countries’ real GDP.  There 
is an expected positive correlation between SUMGDP and FDI activity and an expected negative 
correlation between GDPDIFSQ and FDI activity.  The intuition is that with some positive level 
of trade frictions, larger and more similar sized markets better support the higher fixed costs 
associated with setting up production across countries (versus exporting) and lead to greater FDI 
activity.   
The third, fourth, fifth terms on the right-hand side of equation (1) are more complicated 
terms related to differences in the two countries relative endowments of skilled labor to unskilled 
labor.  Skilled labor is important in the theory of MNE activity because firms that have firm-
specific assets (which are developed using skilled labor) will have the greatest incentives to 
expand their operations across borders.  In some theories of MNE activity, MNE firms are 
additionally attracted to place production activities in less-skilled countries because production 
activity is less skill-intensive than the headquarter activities conducted in the parent country.  
These are generally models which emphasize vertical reasons for MNE activity; i.e., to locate its 
production activities in countries with lower wages for low-skill-intensive activities.  These 
models would suggest that FDI activity should be stronger between countries with greater 
differences in skilled labor abundance.  Other models that emphasize MNEs motives to locate 
production in large markets to avoid tariffs and transport costs (horizontal MNE models) often 
predict that FDI activity should increase with greater similarities in skilled labor abundance.  In 
equation (1) the SKDIFF variable is the parent country’s skilled labor abundance minus the host  
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country’s skilled labor abundance.  Given the vertical MNE motives that exist in the CMM 
knowledge-capital model, CMM predict a positive correlation between SKDIFF with FDI 
activity from the parent to the host country.  The fourth term is an interaction term between 
SKDIFF and GDPDIFF, the parent country’s GDP minus the host country’s GDP.  CMM 
suggest that the knowledge-capital model predicts a negative correlation between this variable 
and FDI from the parent to the host country, since the theory predicts larger effects of SKDIFF 
on FDI when the parent country is a lot smaller than the host country.  Finally, CMM include a 
fifth term that interacts the square of SKDIFF multiplied by trade openness in the host country.  
The predicted sign from their model on this term is positive.
18 
In addition to the variables just described, additional control variables (Zij) have typically 
been included in the CMM empirical framework.  First, distance (DISTANCEij) is included to 
proxy for transport and other trade costs that may affect a firm’s decision about whether to 
become an MNE.  Second, trade openness for both the parent and host countries (T_OPENi and 
T_OPENj ) affect the MNE’s ability to trade intermediates and final goods, which then affects 
the location of MNEs.  Greater openness in the host country should lower FDI activity because it 
lowers trade frictions and makes exporting a relatively more attractive method of serving the host 
market than FDI.  Greater openness in the parent country should increase FDI, since it makes it 
easier to ship goods back to the parent country from foreign affiliates.  FDI openness of the host 
country (F_OPENj) proxies for the costs of setting up an MNE, with greater openness expected 
to increase FDI activity. 
The last independent variable on the right hand side of equation (1) is our focus variable:  
a measure of bilateral investment tax treaty activity.   There are substantial measurement issues 
that determine how we define this variable.  In particular, we can observe when countries make 
bilateral investment tax treaties with each other, but these treaties certainly differ from each other 
along many dimensions which are very difficult to quantify.  In addition, the same treaty on 
                                                           
18 In CMM (2001) they interact the skill difference term with host trade costs, the opposite of host trade openness.  
Thus, we expect the opposite sign on this coefficient than they do.  See CMM (2001) for further details on the 
knowledge-capital model.  
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paper can have vastly different consequences for different pairs of countries depending on the 
unilaterally-adopted tax practices of the countries before entering the treaty.  There is little that 
can be quantified across treaties with the exception of agreed-upon tax withholding rates.  
Unfortunately, these withholding rates are typically maximum allowable rates and there is 
evidence that countries sometimes set rates below these maximum allowable rates after the 
treaty, making them uninformative for our purposes of analysis (Blonigen and Davies, 2000; 
2001).  Because of these difficulties, we primarily measure tax treaty activity in this chapter as a 
binary variable taking the value of “1” if two countries have a bilateral tax treaty in place and “0” 
if they do not.  As a result, we will only be able to estimate an average total impact of tax treaties 
across our sample of countries. 
While we only report results on the effect of bilateral tax treaties using the empirical 
CMM framework described above, we note that we get qualitatively similar results for the 
impact of tax treaties when using alternative empirical frameworks.  This includes variations of 
the CMM framework found in Markusen and Maskus (1999) and a “gravity-type” framework 
which posits FDI activity as only a function of the size of the countries (proxied by real GDP) 
and distance.  In addition, Blonigen, Davies and Head (2002) show that the CMM framework 
misspecifies the SKDIFF and GDPDIFF terms, which should be expressed in absolute values.  
While this correction strongly affects the implications of the relationship between skill 
differences and FDI activity, it has virtually zero quantitative effect on our estimates of treaty 
effects.  Although results from these alternative empirical specifications have been omitted for 
space, they are available upon request from the authors.  
 
III.  Data 
One of the major hurdles in the analysis of the effect of bilateral tax treaties on FDI is 
data constraints.  As noted above, this begins with measuring the treaty activity.  However, there 
are also significant measurement issues with respect to the data on bilateral FDI activity as well.  
For this study we use OECD data on bilateral FDI stocks and flows, as reported by OECD- 
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member countries.
19  Such data were not even compiled into a publicly-available form until 1993 
with the first annual OECD International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook.
20   Since the 
data are collected from national sources in each country, there is substantial variation in coverage 
by country source and by year, and there is variation in measurement of FDI activity itself.  
Almost all countries report inflows and outflows for at least some select bilateral pairings, with 
about half also reporting measures of inward and outward stocks of FDI.  The earliest data 
available begin in 1982.  Table 1 provides further details on data coverage across OECD 
countries and years in our sample. 
There are definite comparability issues of FDI measures across countries.  For example, a 
number of OECD countries do not include reinvested earnings by firms in their measures of FDI. 
Countries can also differ in what percentage of foreign-owned shares of a firm are necessary for 
it to be classified as FDI rather than portfolio investment.
21  However, with only a couple 
exceptions, we note that FDI definitions are fairly consistent for the same country over time.  
This is important because in our statistical analysis we will be able to use techniques that 
estimate relationships between variables using only the sample data variation within individual 
countries over time, avoiding cross-country data measurement consistency problems that arise 
for other statistical techniques. 
Besides our FDI and tax treaty measures, our statistical analysis employs the additional 
CMM empirical framework control variables.  Our data on real GDP, which is used to construct 
                                                           
19 As mentioned in the section above, Carr, Markusen and Maskus (2001) and Markusen and Maskus 
(2001) use U.S. data on MNEs’ foreign affiliate sales, which is a theoretically  preferable measure of 
MNE activity.  However, to our knowledge, there are very few countries that keep track of affiliate sales, 
and there is no comprehensive cross-country database of foreign affiliate sales activity, even for OECD 
countries. 
20 These data are available in print form in these annual yearbooks or in electronic form on the OECD 
Statistical Compendium CD-ROM, available for purchase from the OECD.  
21 IMF and OECD guidelines specify investment as FDI when acquired shares are 10 percent or higher of 
target firm’s outstanding stock, which many of the countries follow or eventually adopted.  Graham and 
Krugman (1993) find that the foreign parent of a MNE in the U.S. on average owns 77.5 percent of the 
affiliates equity, suggesting that this problem may not be overwhelming.  
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the SUMGDP and GDPDIFSQ variables, come from the well-known Penn World Tables, which 
are described by Summers and Heston (1991) and are available online at 
http://datacentre.chass.utoronto.ca:5680/pwt/.  To construct our measure of differences in skilled 
labor endowments, we use World Bank data on the average country-level education attainment 
as a proxy for such endowments.  Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993) provide further details on these 
data. DISTANCE was measured as the distance between capital cities as reported by the Bali 
Online Corporation.  This distance calculator can be found at http://www.indo.com.  Trade 
openness measures of the two countries were obtained from the Penn World Tables and are 
defined as a country’s total trade flows (exports plus imports) divided by its GDP.  The F_OPENj 
was constructed in a similar manner as a country’s total FDI flows divided by its GDP using the 
United Nations’ World Investment Directory.  Details on this variable construction can be found 
in Blonigen and Davies (2001).   
The Penn World Tables run only through 1992, while our FDI data begin in 1982 at the 
earliest.  These data availability issues limit our sample and analysis to the period from 1982 
through 1992.   
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of our dependent and independent variables.  We 
have 3276 observations on FDI outflows by OECD countries, and 2235 observations on FDI 
outbound stock.  Average annual bilateral FDI outflows are almost $284 million with substantial 
variation across observations (standard deviation of just more than $1 billion).
22  Average FDI 
outbound stock is $3.378 billion with a standard deviation of $8 billion.
23  About 77 percent of 
the sample observations are of bilateral country pairs with bilateral tax treaties in place.  The 
majority of these (74 percent) are what we term “old” treaties which were in place before our 
sample begins, with three percent of the sample observations connected to “new” treaties that 
                                                           
22 These figures are in 1995 U.S. dollars. 
23 We remind the reader that these are figures for those bilateral pairs reported by each OECD country, 
which are typically skewed toward only reporting the countries with which it has the largest FDI activity.  
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were enacted during our sample.  We discuss the importance of this distinction for our statistical 
analysis in more detail below. 
 
IV.  Statistical Analysis and Results 
Our statistical analysis will proceed in stages, beginning with a relatively naive 
estimation of equation (1), and then proceeding with more sophisticated estimation procedures to 
correct for potential statistical problems.  We do this to show that it is not easy to estimate the 
true effect of tax treaties on FDI, primarily because many treaties by OECD countries were in 
place before our sample begins.  Most of these “old” treaties are between OECD countries, with 
many beginning in the decade after WWII.  If we get a positive correlation between our tax 
treaty variable and our dependent variable, FDI activity, it is not clear whether other 
unobservable characteristics of the tax treaty country pairings may be leading to both increased 
FDI activity and a tax treaty.  This occurs because the tax treaty variable, a simple binary 
variable, will pick up any residual effects on FDI that are not measured by the other control 
regressors.  This problem, known as simultaneity, makes identification of the treaty effect 
difficult to measure.  For example, there are likely a number of underlying reasons beyond their 
bilateral tax treaty that explain why the U.S. and the U.K. have large FDI activity with each 
other.  These other reasons, however, may not be observable.  Because of this, statistical analysis 
will assign the influence of the unobserved factors to the observed existence of a treaty.  As such, 
while statistical analysis would indicate a strong positive relationship between the existence of a 
treaty and FDI activity, one hesitates to say that the treaty causes the activity between the two 
countries. 
However, our sample also includes a number of bilateral tax treaties completed by OECD 
countries after our sample data begins.  These “new” treaties afford a much better opportunity to 
measure the impact of a tax treaty, as we have data on FDI activity both before and after the 
treaty takes place.  Presuming that there are no other changes occurring at the time of the treaty 
that would affect FDI (besides those captured by our control regressors), we can estimate the  
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effect of these new treaties on FDI more precisely by comparing the pre- and post-treaty 
information.  Table 3 lists new treaties that were completed by OECD countries after the first 
year of our sample, 1983, through the last year of our sample, 1992.
24  As we show below, the 
estimated effects of old treaties versus new treaties on FDI activity are quite different.  Given 
this discussion, we give much more weight to the credibility of our evidence for new treaties.  
Column (1) of Table 4 provides statistical results when we use ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression techniques to estimate equation (1) on our full sample of countries and years 
when FDI activity is measured as the parent country’s FDI stock in the host country.  Column (2) 
of Table 4 provides statistical results when we conduct the same procedure, but define our FDI 
activity measure as the parent country’s FDI flow into the host country.  With the exception of 
SKDIFF and the trade openness measures, the control variables have their predicted signs and 
are generally statistically significant in the FDI stock and FDI flow regressions.  The SKDIFF 
variable is estimated with an incorrect negative sign in both regressions, but is not statistically 
significant at standard levels of statistical confidence.  The general fit of the empirical 
framework to the data is better for the FDI stock regression, where the control variables explain 
about 34 percent of the variation in the dependent variable, as compared to the FDI flow 
regression, where only about 10 percent of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by 
the independent variables.   
Both statistical regressions provide strong evidence for a positive effect of tax treaties on 
FDI activity.  Everything else equal, the presence of a tax treaty means almost an extra $2.5 
billion of parent FDI stock in the host country versus a situation where there was no bilateral tax 
treaty.  This is quite significant given an average of $3.4 billion in FDI stock in the sample.   The 
effect of treaties on FDI flows is estimated to be somewhat larger relative to its mean.  
Everything else equal, the presence of a tax treaty means an extra $234 million of annual parent 
                                                           
24 We note that because of missing data, some of the bilateral pairs completing treaties in Table 3, are not 
covered by our sample. More specifically, nineteen of the new bilateral treaties in Table 3 are covered in 
our sample in at least one of the two possible directions.  
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FDI flows into the host country, compared to an average annual flow of $284 million.  Even 
setting issues of magnitude aside, these estimates suggest that we can be over 99 percent 
confident that these coefficient estimates are not zero.  
As mentioned above, our sample includes both old treaties that occur before our sample 
period begins and new treaties that occur during our sample’s time period.  Because of this, it is 
not clear whether the strongly positive treaty effects in columns (1) and (2) are the result of the 
treaties themselves or some other unobserved factor.  To deal with this, columns (3) and (4) of 
Table 4 provide results when we estimate the same empirical framework as in columns (1) and 
(2), but allow for separate effects for old and new treaties; i.e., separate binary variables 
indicating whether an old or new treaty is present between the bilateral country pair in a given 
year or not.  The estimated effects of old and new treaties are quite different for both of our 
specifications (FDI stock and FDI flows).  Old treaties continue to show a positive effect on FDI 
activity, and that effect continues to be highly statistically significant and of slightly larger 
magnitude than our results in columns (1) and (2).  Our estimates suggest that the presence of an 
old treaty increases outbound FDI stock by $2.8 billion (compared to $2.5 billion in the column 
(1) estimates) and increases outbound FDI flows by $258 million (compared to $242 million in 
the column (2) estimates).  In contrast, new treaties yield coefficient estimates that are negative 
in sign.  However, given high standard errors relative to the small coefficient estimates, we 
cannot statistically reject the hypothesis that the new treaties have no impact on FDI activity.  
As mentioned above, it is difficult to assign causation to the old treaty effects because 
they are in place before our sample period begins – the positive correlation may just suggest that 
countries that would naturally have high FDI activity due to other (unobserved) factors also 
make sure they have a bilateral tax treaty in place.
25  This is particularly worrisome since our 
                                                           
25 There is a similar, though milder, concern that the new treaties occur because FDI activity is increasing 
or expected to increase between the countries due to unobserved factors. However, this would be 
expected to bias us toward finding a positive correlation between new treaties and FDI activity.  In 
contrast, our results below find evidence for a negative correlation.   
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(observed) control variables do not even account for half of the variation in the dependent 
variables.  A common way to control for unobserved characteristics that affect the FDI activity 
between a bilateral pair of countries is to estimate what is known as a fixed effects specification.  
This means that, in addition our control variables, we also include a binary variable for each 
bilateral country pairing.  These binary fixed-effect country-pair variables will estimate the 
aggregate effect of time-invariant characteristics (both observed and unobserved) that raise or 
lower the FDI activity for that bilateral pairing versus the average. In other words, it acts as an 
intercept term that is specific to the bilateral country pair.   With fixed effects, our estimates then 
come only from the time series variation in our variables within each bilateral country pair, not 
the variation across bilateral country pairs.  Note that now the effects of our time-invariant 
regressors, distance and old treaties, will be subsumed into these fixed effects.  In other words, 
we cannot identify the effects of old treaties separately from other time-invariant characteristics, 
such as historical conditions, that affect the overall FDI activity between a bilateral country pair.  
Because of this, we focus solely on the new treaties enacted at some point during the sample of 
years.  Estimation using only the variation within bilateral country pairs provides an additional 
benefit since it can help to reduce the problems caused by different definitions of FDI activity 
across the countries in our sample, providing more credible estimates. 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 present our fixed effects empirical estimation results.  
The fit of the equations increases dramatically: 94 percent of the variation in the dependent 
variable is explained in the FDI stock regression and 38 percent of the variation is explained in 
the FDI flow regression.  Not surprisingly, statistical tests easily confirm that the fixed effect 
variables are jointly statistically significant for explaining FDI activity.  The main CMM 
framework control variables still perform well.  In fact, the skilled-labor difference variable 
(SKDIFF), now has the correct sign and is statistically significant.  However, the trade openness 
measures generally have the wrong sign in these regressions.   
The surprising result in columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 is that the estimated effect of the 
new treaties on FDI activity is now strongly negative.  The estimated impact has increased  
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substantially and the effects are much more statistically significant: A new treaty leads to a $2.6 
billion decrease in FDI stock and $351 million decrease in annual FDI flows.  In column (3), we 
introduce a lagged dependent variable to control for dynamic adjustment in our FDI stock 
equation as there is probably persistence in the FDI stock over time that can lead to statistical 
problems with our estimates.  The coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is statistically 
significant, but does not seriously affect our other regressor coefficient estimates, including the 
new treaty variable.
26 
In summary, we estimate very different correlations between old treaties and FDI activity 
versus new treaties and FDI activity.  Given the simultaneity concerns described above, it is 
difficult to assign much weight to our old treaty evidence for positive effects on FDI, even 
though it is the best we can do given data constraints.  Because consistent recording of FDI 
activity began much later than the enactment of these old treaties, it is virtually impossible to 
identify the effect of the treaties on FDI activity from other country-pair characteristics that 
might affect both the inherent FDI activity and the incentives to have treaties.  In contrast, we are 
much more confident in our new treaty estimates from a statistical standpoint and these results 
yield a very surprising conclusion: new treaties are not promoting FDI activity and the evidence 
suggests that they may even be decreasing FDI activity. 
While this new treaty result is surprising, it is confirmed by Blonigen and Davies (2001) 
using a completely different database on U.S.-only FDI activity.  The U.S. data, collected by the 
U.S. Bureau of Economic Activity (BEA), is arguably the best-measured and most 
comprehensive data on FDI activity of any country in the world.  The BEA has data on U.S. 
bilateral FDI activity (both inbound and outbound) stretching back as far as 1966 for FDI flows 
and stock and the early 1980s for affiliate sales.
27  Using this U.S. database and U.S. bilateral tax 
                                                           
26 A lagged dependent variable is not statistically significant in the FDI flow specifications. 
27 Of course, the disadvantage of the U.S. data versus the OECD data is that its observations are all tied to 
one country, making it difficult to know whether the results from such a sample generalize to the rest of 
the world.  
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treaty activity, Blonigen and Davies (2001) also find evidence for substantial negative effects of 
new treaties on FDI activity.  In an earlier version of the paper, Blonigen and Davies (2000), had 
similarly addressed the issue of  old versus new treaties by estimating the U.S.-only sample 
without observations connected with Canada, Japan and European countries.  They found that 
the remaining sample still displayed positive effects of tax treaties on FDI activity, but with a 
very long lag.  However, this result was driven by the fact that the reduced sample still contained 
FDI activity with a few remaining old treaty partners, specifically Australia and New Zealand.  
Once all of the old treaty partners are eliminated from the sample, as effectively done in 
Blonigen and Davies (2001), results are consistent with this chapter’s results for OECD 
countries: There is no credible evidence in the data that tax treaties have significant positive 
effects on FDI activity.  
 
V.  Conclusion 
The majority of economic and legal texts stress the intuitive notion that bilateral tax 
treaties should promote FDI activity.  As discussed in the introduction, there are a number of 
reasons why this may not be true in theory.  This chapter adds to this debate by providing some 
of the first evidence on the effect of bilateral tax treaties on FDI activity.  Using OECD data we 
find that new treaty activity (during the 1983-1992 period) suggests strong negative impacts on 
FDI.  While we find a positive correlation in the case of much older treaties, we cannot weight 
this evidence very heavily as we cannot observe FDI activity before these treaties were in place.  
These results are consistent with previous work by Blonigen and Davies (2001) using only U.S. 
data.  Thus, in conjunction with this earlier work, our results cast doubt upon the FDI promotion 
rationale for treaty formation, which stands in contrast to the conventional wisdom among many 
economists and lawyers.   
One possible reason for the non-promotion effect of treaties on FDI activity is that 
treaties reduce firms’ abilities to evade taxes through transfer pricing or treaty shopping.  Our 
data on aggregate FDI activity are not well-suited to address whether these issues connected with  
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firm-level behavior are behind the overall result.  An additional possibility for non-promotion of 
FDI activity by new treaties is that treaties may increase investment uncertainty, at least in the 
short run.  Since a new treaty has yet to be tested in the courts of the partner countries, it may 
actually increase the perceived risk of investment between treaty partners until the legal 
interpretation of the treaty has been resolved.  Thus, in the short run, the treaty may lead to a 
reduction in FDI activity.  Over the long run, however, this uncertainty will be resolved, clearing 
the way for the treaty to promote investment.   However, when we alter our new treaty dummy 
variable to only take the value of  “1” a year (or even two years) after the treaty was enacted, we 
get similar negative and statistically significant effects of new treaties on FDI activity.  This 
would argue that the uncertainty issue is not behind the effects we find unless it takes many years 
to resolve such uncertainty.  On the other hand, our work with U.S. data in Blonigen and Davies 
(2001) found evidence that the negative drop in FDI activity seemed to occur mainly at the time 
of the treaty.  We leave these and other important issues for future work and hope that these 
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3276 283.82 1056.61  -2550.56  42267.61 














GDPDIFSQij 3276  1993241 4710473  0.11  2.06e+07 
SKDIFFij 3276  1.21 2.54  -6.65  8.10 
SKDIFFij*GDPDIFFij 3276  2124.00 5374.54  -7494.69  31011.47 
(SKDIFFij)
2*T_OPENj 3276  475.35 821.85  0.00  8850.60 
DISTANCEij 3276  5695.07 5129.36  174.00  19007.00 
T_OPENi 3276  56.38 31.01  17.62  156.45 
T_OPENj 3276  68.22 55.26  8.96  386.23 
F_OPENj 3276  12.42 14.20  0.15  93.69 
TREATYij  3276  0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00 
OLD TREATYij  3276  0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00 
NEW TREATYij  3276  0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 
NOTES: FDI outbound stock, FDI outflows, SUMGDP, and GDPDIFSQ are measured in 
millions of real U.S. dollars.  Distance is measured in miles between capital cities.  Skill 
differences is measured in mean years of female and male education attainment.  See text for 
variable definitions.  
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Table 3: New Treaties by OECD Countries from 1983-1992. 
Country  Bilateral Tax Treaties (Year of Treaty in Parentheses) 
Australia  Italy(1983), Korea(1983), Norway(1983), Ireland(1984), 
Finland(1985), Austria (1987), China(1990), Thailand(1990), 
Hungary(1992), Poland(1992).  
Austria Thailand(1986),  Australia(1987). 
Belgium-Luxembourg
a Korea(1985),  Turkey(1988). 
Canada  Bangladesh(1983), Brazil(1985), Cyprus(1986), India(1986), 
China(1987), Kenya(1987), Poland(1989), Slovak Republic(1987). 
Denmark  Cyprus(1984), Indonesia(1986), China(1987). 
Finland  Australia(1985), New Zealand(1985), Turkey(1985), 
Thailand(1986), China(1987), Yugoslavia(1987), Indonesia(1988). 
France  Bangladesh(1988), Trinidad and Tobago(1988), Nigeria(1991). 
Germany  Philippines(1984), Turkey(1986), Indonesia(1988). 
Greece  Hungary(1984), Switzerland(1984), Czechoslovakia (1987), 
Norway(1989). 
Iceland None. 
Ireland  Australia(1984), New Zealand(1987). 
Italy China(1987),  India(1987). 
Japan Indonesia(1983). 
Netherlands  Pakistan (1983), Romania(1983), China(1987), India (1989), Brazil 
(1991). 
New Zealand  Norway(1983), Finland(1985), Ireland(1987), Indonesia(1988). 
Norway  Australia(1983), New Zealand(1983), Yugoslavia(1984), 
China(1987), Pakistan(1987), Philippines(1988), Greece (1989). 
Portugal None. 
Spain Yugoslavia(1983). 
Sweden  Trinidad and Tobago(1985), China(1987), Cyprus(1989), 
Indonesia(1989), Turkey(1989). 
Switzerland  Greece(1984), Egypt(1988), Indonesia(1989), China(1991). 
Turkey  Finland(1985), Germany(1986), Belgium-Luxembourg(1988) 
Sweden(1989).  
United Kingdom  India(1983), Thailand(1983), China(1985), India(1987). 
United States  Barbados(1984), China(1985), Tunisia(1986), Cyprus(1988), 
Indonesia(1989), India(1990), Spain(1991). 




Table 4: Estimates of treaty effects on OECD outbound FDI stock and flows using 
Ordinary Least Squares. 
  Empirical Models and Dependent Variables 
  Ordinary Least Squares with 
Treaty Variable 
Ordinary Least Squares with 
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NEW TREATY   
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(0.74) 













   4.368** 
       (0.00) 
 
 
   0.426** 
      (0.00) 
 
 
    4.426** 
       (0.00) 
 
 
  0.431** 
      (0.00) 
GDPDIFSQij  
 
  - 0.0001 
       (0.16) 
- 0.00004** 
(0.00) 
   - 0.0001 
(0.09) 
- 0.00004** 
      (0.00) 
SKDIFFij 
 
       2.948 
(0.97) 
    - 5.747 
      (0.51) 
     65.085 
(0.41) 
    - 1.017 
(0.91) 
SKDIFFij * GDPDIFFij   - 0.315** 
(0.00) 
- 0.020** 








   - 0.697** 
      (0.00) 
   - 0.049 
      (0.10) 
   - 0.623** 
      (0.01) 
   - 0.039 
      (0.18) 








T_OPENi      - 7.567 
(0.42) 
    - 0.430 
(0.54) 
    - 4.767 
(0.61) 




  - 26.184** 
(0.00) 
    - 1.347* 
(0.02) 






















F Test  112.14**   38.31**  113.21**    35.45** 
Sample Size         2235         3276         2235         3276 
NOTES: P-values are in parentheses, with ** and * denoting statistical confidence levels at the 
99 and 95 percent levels, respectively. P-values indicate statistical probability (in decimal form) 
that the true parameter value is zero (i.e., has no effect on the dependent variable). R-squared is 
the ratio of the variation in the dependent variable explained by the regressors.  F test is a 
statistical test of whether we can reject the hypothesis that the coefficients of the regressors are 
jointly zero.  
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Table 5: Estimates of treaty effects on OECD outbound FDI stock and flows using a fixed 
effects specification. 
  Empirical Models and Dependent Variables 
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0.96        
F Test          95.46**       12.94**           192.87**    
Sample Size           2235                  3276                  2041        
NOTES: P-values are in parentheses, with ** and * denoting statistical confidence levels at the 
99 and 95 percent levels, respectively. P-values indicate statistical probability (in decimal form) 
that the true parameter value is zero (i.e., has no effect on the dependent variable). R-squared is 
the ratio of the variation in the dependent variable explained by the regressors.  F test is a 
statistical test of whether we can reject the hypothesis that the coefficients of the regressors are 
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